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THE PROBLEMS OF SELFEXECUTION: MEDELLÍN v. TEXAS
TARYN MARKS*

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 28, 2008, in a case that has involved an international
tribunal’s decision,1 three habeas petitions,2 two writ petitions to the
Supreme Court,3 a writ dismissed as improvidently granted,4 and a
Presidential Memorandum to the Attorney General,5 the Supreme
Court rejected a decision of the International Court of Justice
6
(“ICJ”). In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that the ICJ’s
ruling in Avena and other Mexican Nationals7 does not have
automatic, directly-enforceable effect in domestic courts because
none of the treaties at issue were self-executing and because the
President of the United States does not have the authority to
implement the Avena judgment domestically by writing a
memorandum to the Attorney General.8
Because the Court so narrowly defined the holding in Medellín
and refused to grant the power to enforce the Avena decision to

* 2009 J.D./L.L.M Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 7, 11, 13, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984).
To simplify citations, I will use the short form “Medellín” to refer to the Supreme Court
decision. Any other case in which Medellín was involved will always be cited by the full case
name.
3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medellín, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984) [hereinafter
Petition for Certiorari I]; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005)
(No. 04-5928) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari II].
4. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. at 662 (“Th[e] state court proceeding may provide
Medellín with the very reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that he now seeks in the
present proceeding. . . . [W]e dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.”).
5. Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with the Decision of the
International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
6. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1346.
7. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
8. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1363, 1371.
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either the ICJ or to the President,9 Medellín will have little domestic
effect. It will, however, create significant international ripples—in fact,
it already has.10
A. The Beginning of the End: The Legal Path to Medellín
At its core, Medellín centers on the requirements of one Article in
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights (“Vienna Convention”):
Article 36(1).11 Although the Vienna Convention’s requirements are
fairly innocuous,12 Article 36(1) has been the source of increasing
tension between the United States and the ICJ,13 particularly because
the Supreme Court and the ICJ have reached irreconcilable
conclusions about the Article’s meaning and its domestic
implications.14 This divergence has only increased with time.
The ICJ and the Supreme Court’s disagreement began when the
Supreme Court ruled in Breard v. Greene that state procedural default
rules bar an Article 36(1) claim if the defendant failed to raise that
claim at trial, even if the defendant argued that the state violated a
treaty right.15 The Court determined that, regardless of the Vienna

9. See id. at 1367 n.13 (noting that “the questions here are . . . far more limited ones”).
10. See Unofficial Press Release, International Court of Justice, Request for Interpretation
of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America), July 16, 2008, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/139/14637.pdf?PHPSESSID=75b6f75992c068e2fb48a80ddccac988.
11. Article 36(1) requires that a State inform a non-citizen arrested or detained within that
State’s borders that the non-citizen has a right to inform the consulate of his own country of his
status and to request legal aid from that consulate. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
12. Article 36(1) requires only that the arresting State inform the non-citizen of the rights
granted by Article 36; after the State informs the non-citizen of the Vienna Convention rights,
the non-citizen must then request that the arresting State inform the non-citizen’s consulate. Id.
One of the main sources of contention between the United States and the ICJ has been the
interpretation of Section 2 of the Vienna Convention. This Section allows a State to choose the
means by which it will domestically implement the rights in Section 1 of the Vienna Convention,
but requires that any implementation give “full effect . . . to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended.” Id.; see also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375
(1998) (per curiam) (examining the meaning of “full effect”).
13. See Curtis Bradley, Lori Fisher Damrosch & Martin Flaherty, Discussion, Medellín v.
Dretke: Federalism and International Law (Feb. 21, 2005), 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 667,
672 (2005).
14. Compare Breard, 523 U.S. at 375 (holding that state procedural default rules apply to
Article 36(1) claims) with LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 497–98 (June 27) (holding that
applying state procedural default rules to Article 36(1) claims breaches the Vienna
Convention).
15. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375. Under state procedural rules, a federal habeas petitioner is
barred from raising a claim on collateral review that the petitioner did not raise in state court or
on direct appeal, unless the petitioner can show both cause and prejudice. See Sanchez-Llamas
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Convention’s constitutional status, Article 36(1) rights are subject to
the same constraints as any other domestic right16 because “the
procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of [a]
17
treaty in that State.”
The ICJ reached the opposite conclusion in LaGrand, in which it
held that when the United States allowed the procedural default rule
to prevent a defendant from asserting an Article 36(1) claim, the
United States breached its treaty obligation to give “full effect” to
18
Article 36(1) rights. The ICJ interpreted “full effect” to mean that
the United States should review the merits of all Article 36(1) claims,
19
regardless of any procedural problems.
Three years later, in Avena, the ICJ again found that the United
States had breached its Vienna Convention treaty obligations.20 To
remedy this breach, the ICJ ordered the United States to “review and
reconsider” all of the cases that Mexico had identified.21 Review and
reconsideration, according to the ICJ, “guarantees that full weight is
given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna
Convention.”22 The Supreme Court and the ICJ both acknowledged
that the United States had breached its treaty obligations, but the two
differed on the meaning of “full effect.”
The Supreme Court specifically addressed this difference in
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.23 There, the Court held that the ICJ’s
interpretation of “full effect,” which required the United States to
overrule its procedural default rules, should be granted deference, but
that the ICJ could not dictate the Court’s own interpretation of “full
effect.”24 Procedural default rules apply the same to treaty-based

v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350, 355–57 (2006) (explaining procedural default rules and the
rationale behind them).
16. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375.
17. Id.
18. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497–98. The treaty states: “[The receiving State] must enable
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended.” Vienna Convention, supra note 11, 21 U.S.T. at 91, 596 U.N.T.S. at 275.
19. Because the brothers on whose behalf Germany brought the case were executed prior
to the ICJ’s decision, the ICJ only generally mentioned the remedy for a breach of the treaty.
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 513–14; see also Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12, 59 (Mar. 31) (describing the ICJ’s decision in the LaGrand case).
20. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 65.
21. Id. at 72–73. Mexico had brought the claim on behalf of fifty-one Mexicans and
requested a remedy for the United States’ breach of the treaty. Id. at 59.
22. Id. at 65.
23. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
24. Id. at 351.
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claims as they do to other claims, according to the Court, first, because
the Supreme Court, not the ICJ, ultimately interprets United States
federal law;25 second, because ICJ decisions are not binding on even
26
the ICJ beyond the particular case in question; third, because the
executive branch had expressed its disagreement with the decision in
Avena;27 and fourth, because procedural default rules are an
important part of the United States’ domestic legal system to which
28
even Constitutional rights are subject.
Medellín took advantage of one of these factors—that ICJ
decisions are not binding—to slip through a loophole in the reasoning
of Sanchez-Llamas: he argued that because he was one of the fiftyone Mexicans named in Avena, the United States was therefore
29
bound by treaty to effectuate the Avena judgment.
B. The Manipulations of the Medellín Case: Procedural Postures and
Facts
The underlying facts of Medellín are compelling and brutal but
factored minimally within the Court’s decision. Medellín confessed in
writing that he had participated in the gang-rape and murder of two
teenage girls, and a Texas jury convicted him of murder during the
commission of a sexual assault and sentenced him to death.30 After
unsuccessfully appealing to the highest level of the state court system,

25. Id. at 353 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
26. Id. at 354.
27. Id. at 355. The United States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ for
disputes related to breaches of the Vienna Convention as a result of the decision in this case.
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, pt. 1, chap. III, § 8, Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/
chapterIII/treaty33.asp (providing an updated list of all parties to the treaty and noting the
United States’ withdrawal from that treaty); see also Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (describing the obligations of signatory countries and
the means by which countries can withdraw from the Protocol).
28. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 357–58. The Court also noted that allowing this broad
interpretation of “full effect” to trump state procedural default rules could also be used to
trump other important rules, such as the statute of limitations. Id. at 257; see also Medellín v.
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367 (2008) (agreeing with the Court’s view in Sanchez-Llamas that
allowing Avena to trump state law would be “extraordinary”).
29. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 22.
30. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1354; see also Brief for Respondent at 1, Medellín, 128 S. Ct.
(No. 06-984) (detailing the grim facts of the case).
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including a state habeas petition,31 Medellín filed a federal habeas
petition, which the federal district court denied.32 The district court
also refused his request for a certificate of appealability.33 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied Medellín’s appeal of the district
34
court’s ruling.
Medellín then petitioned for, and the Supreme Court granted,
certiorari to determine whether the United States was bound to
reconsider the claims of the fifty-one Mexican nationals involved in
35
the Avena case. Medellín’s case was pending before the Supreme
Court when President Bush, in a memorandum to the Attorney
General of the United States, ordered that “State courts [should] give

31. Medellín’s conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Brief for
Respondent, supra note 30, at 3–4, and his state petition for habeas corpus was denied in part
because he procedurally defaulted on his Vienna Convention claim by failing to raise it at the
trial level and in part because the court determined that he had not been prejudiced by the
violation of his Vienna Convention right. Ex Parte Medellín, Order No. 675430-A (339th Dist.
Ct. Jan. 22, 2001); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 3–4 (describing Medellín’s
procedural history). Medellín chose to return to the state court rather than appeal to the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari. Medellín v. Cockrell, Civ. Order No. H-01-4078 (S.D. Tex.
June 25, 2003). The District Court also denied the Vienna Convention claim because it held that
Medellín was essentially an American citizen (although Medellín was born in Mexico and
retained his Mexican citizenship, he lived in the United States for almost his entire life, went to
school in the United States, and was fluent in English) and that a private individual cannot
enforce the Vienna Convention. Ex Parte Medellín, Order No. 50,191-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct.
3, 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 3
(reviewing the district court’s holding). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
denial. Ex Parte Medellín, Order No. 50,191-01; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at
4 (summarizing the court’s holding).
32. The federal district court denied the petition for substantially the same reasons as the
state court. Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 4–5.
33. Medellín v. Cockrell, Civ. Order No. H-01-4078; Brief for Respondent, supra note 30,
at 4–5.
34. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004). The court held both that the Vienna
Convention does not confer individually-enforceable rights and that the court was bound by
Breard’s determination that Vienna Convention rights were subject to procedural default rules,
rather than by the ICJ’s more recent, contrary decision in Avena. Id. at 279–80; see also
Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1355 (2008) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s decision).
Medellín’s petition to the Fifth Circuit was pending when the ICJ decided Avena. Brief for
Respondent, supra note 30, at 4–5.
35. Petition for Certiorari I, supra note 3; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 6
(describing the issues presented in Medellín’s first petition for certiorari). The issue presented in
Medellín was different than that presented in Sanchez-Llamas because the Court was
considering a judgment that was binding on the United States: the ICJ had specifically ordered
the United States to review and reconsider the cases of the fifty-one Mexicans about whom the
case was brought, one of whom was Medellín, and thus the United States was bound by the ICJ
Statute to review Medellín’s case. Sanchez-Llamas was not one of the Mexicans named in the
Avena judgment and therefore the United States was not technically required to adhere to the
ICJ’s judgment in regards to Sanchez-Llamas as it was in regards to Medellín.

DO NOT DELETE

5/18/2009 4:25:05 PM

196 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:191

effect to the [Avena] decision in accordance with general principles of
comity.”36
Citing the President’s memorandum, Medellín filed a second
37
habeas petition in Texas state court. The Supreme Court then
dismissed Medellín’s writ as improvidently granted, stating that the
Texas state court could provide the review that Medellín sought and
38
obviate the need for Supreme Court review.
Once again in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Medellín
argued that Texas’s habeas corpus statute, which in this case required
that the legal basis for a second habeas petition be unavailable at the
39
time of the original claim, was satisfied by either the Avena
judgment or the President’s memorandum.40 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals ruled that neither could serve as a basis for the
second appeal: the Supreme Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas
established that Avena did not trump contrary state laws,41 and the
President did not have independent authority sufficient to order the
42
Texas state court to overrule its laws.
Medellín disagreed with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and
so he petitioned for, and the Supreme Court again granted, certiorari
on the issues of whether the Avena decision was binding, directlyenforceable federal law and whether the President had the authority
to implement the Avena decision into federal law and thus preempt
43
state criminal procedural rules.

36. Petition for Certiorari I, supra note 3, at 228. Effectively, the memorandum would have
required that the state courts overlook the procedural default rule for the fifty-one cases at issue
in Avena, and then consider the merits of each individual defendant's claim that the violation of
their Vienna Convention rights had negatively affected the trial. See Avena and other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 57 (Mar. 31); see also Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184,
1187–88 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (following the ICJ’s directive and reviewing Torres’s claim of
prejudice).
37. Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 6.
38. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005).
39. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1) (2003); Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S.
at 663–64; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 6, 7 (describing the Texas habeas
statute’s requirements).
40. Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 330, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Brief for
Respondent, supra note 30, at 7 (noting Medellín’s arguments before the Texas court).
41. Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 332 (noting the consequences of holding that Article
36 claims could overrule state procedural claims, one of which was that “‘Article 36 claims could
trump . . . prohibitions against filing successive habeas petitions’” (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 351 (2006))).
42. Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 342.
43. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008).
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II. THE OPINIONS
A. Majority Rules: The Court’s Opinion
1. The Direct Effect of Avena
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that Avena
was not automatically enforceable domestic federal law. In doing so,
the Court not only rejected Medellín’s argument that the treaties that
obligate the United States to abide by the decisions of the ICJ are
self-executing, but also rejected Medellín’s subsequent argument that
any ICJ judgment issued according to those treaties must also be self44
executing.
Whether the treaties that Medellín identified were self-executing
was thus central to the case and formed a substantial part of the
Court’s opinion. The Court therefore needed to define “selfexecuting” and to formulate a test for determining whether a treaty is
self-executing. In a footnote, the Court laid out (though did not
adopt) one definition: a self-executing treaty is one that “has
automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.”45 To
determine whether a treaty has automatic domestic effect, the Court
examined the treaty’s text, negotiation history, and post-ratification
understandings.46
The foundation of the Court’s main argument—that ICJ
judgments are not automatically domestically binding—was the text
of the treaties Medellín identified. The Court found that none of these
treaties (the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, the United
Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute) were self-executing.
The first treaty, the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention,
offers just a “bare grant of jurisdiction,” as it requires only that

44. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 20–22. Medellín relied on the Optional Protocol to
the Vienna Convention, the United Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute. Id.; see also Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 2, at 19–20 (arguing that these three treaties obligated the United States
to adhere to the Avena judgment). Congress had not passed any implementing legislation for
any of these treaties. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
45. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1356 n.2. The Court did not explicitly adopt this definition, but
noted that an alternative construction would be that a self-executing treaty grants directly
enforceable individual rights. Id. at 1357; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31,
Medellín, 128 S. Ct. (No. 06-984) (discussing the varied definitions of self-executing).
46. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
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signatory nations submit disputes to the ICJ.47 It does not also require
that signatory nations enforce ICJ judgments.48
Rather, the power to enforce ICJ decisions stems from Article
94(1) of the United Nations Charter, which requires that States
49
“undertake[] to comply” with any ICJ decision. The Court, however,
held that Article 94(1) lacks mandatory language and so interpreted
50
the Article as a non-self-executing, solely contractual commitment.
Because the United States can veto any attempt to enforce an ICJ
judgment under Article 94(1), the United States feasibly could never
51
be bound by any judgment, so the Court refused to hold that the
United Nations Charter was self-executing.52 A holding that the
Charter was self-executing would require the Court to adopt the
incongruous position that the United States would always be bound at
the domestic level by an ICJ judgment, but might never be bound at
the international level.53 Common understanding at the time the
Charter was ratified bolstered the Court’s conclusion: a country
always had the option to choose not to comply with a judgment of the
ICJ for political or diplomatic reasons. Automatic domestic
54
enforcement would nullify that option. These two reasons combined
led the Court to hold that the United Nations Charter is not selfexecuting.
Nor is the ICJ Statute55: the Statute does not provide the requisite
authority to force a United States’ court to obey an ICJ decision.56
First, an ICJ decision binds only the parties involved and only as to
that specific decision; and second, only states can be parties to cases in
47. Id. at 1358.
48. Id.
49. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.
50. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1358–59. The Government had intervened in the case to argue
the Presidential Power Memorandum, but had only submitted an amicus brief arguing against
the domestic effect of ICJ decisions. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Medellín, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-946) [hereinafter Brief for the United
States].
51. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1359. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council
must first decide to enforce a judgment and then issue a resolution to that effect; the United
States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has a veto power over any such
resolution. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
52. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1360.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1359.
55. The ICJ Statute establishes the basic structure and procedures of the ICJ. Statute of the
International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 (1945). See also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at
1353–54 (describing the ICJ and the ICJ Statute).
56. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1360.
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the ICJ, so Medellín was not a party to Avena and therefore cannot
individually enforce the Avena decision.57 This is true even if the case
is brought by a State on behalf of an individual (as Mexico did in
58
Avena). Thus, the ICJ Statute is non-self-executing and cannot be
used as a source of authority to directly enforce ICJ judgments in
domestic courts.
Finally, the Executive Branch’s consistent position that the treaties
at issue are not self-executing also factored into the Court’s
determination because of the weight given to the Executive Branch
on issues related to foreign affairs.59 Based on the language of the
treaties at issue, their ratification history, and Executive Branch policy,
the Court held that ICJ judgments are not self-executing.
The Court then defended the test used to determine whether the
treaties were self-executing and attacked the dissent’s analysis.60 The
Court argued that it should utilize a blanket analysis—focused on the
text of the treaty and congressional understanding of the treaty’s
meaning at the time of its ratification—that could be applied to any
treaty.61 Such an analysis not only followed precedent, but also
recognized the careful procedure established by the United States
62
Constitution’s Framers. In contrast, according to the majority, the
dissent’s analysis ignored the treaty’s text and relied instead on a
context-specific test that could make certain parts of a treaty selfexecuting, and other parts non-self-executing.63 The Court feared that
if the dissent’s test were used, legislative power would shift from
64
Congress to the judiciary : a judge’s ad-hoc decision, rather than the
congressionally-approved language of a treaty, would determine
whether a treaty was self-executing.
Next, the Court supported its conclusion with post-ratification
understandings of the treaties at issue, general interpretive principles,
and the consequences of holding that ICJ judgments are
automatically binding.65 Within these bolstering arguments, however,

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1361.
60. Id. at 1362.
61. Id. at 1361–62.
62. Id. at 1362.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1363–65. Of particular importance to the Court was that no other nation grants
automatic domestic enforcement to a decision by the ICJ. Id. at 1363.
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the Court was careful to specify that its holding applied only to ICJ
judgments and only to the treaties considered—it was not a
categorical determination that any judgment by an international
66
tribunal is non-self-executing. It also was not a categorical denial of
all enforcement mechanisms—the Court noted that this specific
judgment could still be enforced using political and diplomatic
pressure, congressional action, and even a determination that the
Vienna Convention itself is self-executing.67 But, the Court held, the
Avena judgment does not have automatic domestic effect by itself.
Because of this determination, the Court then needed to determine
whether the President could create that domestic effect with a
memorandum to the Attorney General.
2. The President and his Memorandum
To analyze the exercise of government power, the Court began by
considering whether the President had the authority to unilaterally
68
implement the Avena decision. Relying on the analysis of executive
power in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
69
Tube v. Sawyer, the Court determined that the President does not.
The United States intervened in the case to argue that the
Presidential Memorandum constituted binding domestic law. The
Government began by asserting that the President was within the first
Youngstown category and therefore that there was a presumption that
70
the President had the requisite authority to create domestic law.

66. Id. at 1365 (“Our holding does not call into question the ordinary enforcement of
foreign judgments or international arbitral agreements.”).
67. Id. at 1365–67. The Court has never addressed whether the Vienna Convention is selfexecuting, instead, it has always assumed that the Vienna Convention does grant directlyenforceable individual rights. Id. at 1357.
68. Id. at 1368.
69. Id. at 1371 (“[T]he Executive cannot unilaterally execute a non-self-executing treaty by
giving it domestic effect.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635,
637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing an analysis of presidential power).
70. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 10–11; see also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368
(noting the United States’ argument). Under the first category, the President is acting with
maximum executive power, as he has both the power inherent to his position and any power
that Congress has granted to him; there is a strong presumption that any presidential act under
this category is permissible. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. Under the second category, the
President is acting in a “zone of twilight;” although he is acting only with the power inherent to
his position, Congress has neither approved nor disapproved of his action, and thus
congressional inaction can imply that a presidential act is permissible. Id. at 637. Under the third
category, the President is acting at the “lowest ebb” of his power, as Congress has disapproved
of his action, and so the President is acting only with “his own constitutional powers minus any
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Because the Optional Protocol and the United Nations Charter were
duly-ratified treaties, these two treaties implicitly authorized the
President to implement obligations under these treaties.71 The
Medellín Court responded that the Senate approves and the President
signs a non-self-executing treaty on the understanding that the treaty
is not domestic law and cannot be transformed into domestic law
72
without further congressional action. This understanding does not
grant to the President the power to unilaterally implement such
treaties, it “implicitly prohibits him from doing so.”73 Despite the
President’s ability to quickly—and perhaps with a better
74
understanding of the sensitive foreign policy issues at play —
determine whether an ICJ judgment should be enforced, the Court
held that, under balance of powers, only Congress can implement a
treaty.75
The Court then dismissed the United States’ arguments that
“Congress has expressly authorized the President to direct all
functions connected with the United States’ participation in the
76
United Nations” and that the President’s “authoritative role in
77
litigation implicating foreign affairs” provides the power necessary
for the President to unilaterally implement a treaty.78 Although the
Court noted that the President has ample authority to ensure that the
79
United States adheres to its international obligations, the President’s
80
authority does not extend to creating domestic law.
The United States also argued that a long line of cases that
acknowledged the President’s power to resolve foreign disputes
should be interpreted as imputing to him the necessary authority to

constitutional powers of Congress over the matter,” and thus any action that he takes must be
carefully analyzed. Id. at 637–38.
71. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 10–11; see also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368
(noting the United States’ argument).
72. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 14
(“[U]nless the text of the treaty reflects an agreement between the President and the Senate to
create domestic law, no such law is made.”).
73. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369.
74. See Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 11–12 (arguing that “[t]he President is
in the best position to make a determination on those issues” and noting “his ability to respond
expeditiously” to “sensitive foreign policy issues implicated by an ICJ decision”).
75. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369–70.
76. Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 16 (citing 22 U.S.C. 287, 287a).
77. Id. at 18.
78. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1371.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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enforce ICJ judgments.81 Rejecting the United States’ argument, the
Court narrowly defined the authority in those cases as the authority
to make “executive agreements to settle civil claims between
82
American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals,”
and noted the differences between that authority and the power to
create domestic law.83 The United States’ acknowledgement that the
84
memorandum was “unprecedented” only bolstered the Court’s
holding.85
Thus, the Court concluded that the Avena decision does not have
automatically-binding domestic effect and that the President does not
have the authority to unilaterally transform an ICJ judgment into
binding domestic law.
B. The Test for Self-Execution and the Problem with Texas’s
Decision: Justice Stevens’s Concurrence
Justice Stevens’s concurrence began by acknowledging the
86
wisdom of the dissent’s argument, establishing a tone throughout his
opinion that resonated more like a dissent than a concurrence.
Though he was unwilling to go as far as the dissent in holding that the
treaties at issue in this case are self-executing,87 Justice Stevens
strongly objected to the majority’s implicit presumption against selfexecution.88 Despite his objection, Justice Stevens analyzed the
treaties under a rubric that was substantially similar to the majority’s
89
reasoning. He cautioned that under his analysis, the case
“present[ed] a closer question than the Court’s opinion allow[ed],”90
81. Id.; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 12–13 (arguing that, according
to the Court’s precedent, the President has the power to unilaterally implement treaties).
82. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1371.
83. Id.
84. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 29–30,
Bustillo v. Johnson & Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51 & 04-10566).
85. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1372. The Court also briefly considered Medellín’s argument that
the President’s “Take Care” powers under the Constitution (the President should “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. CONST., art II, § 3) provide sufficient authority for
the memorandum to be enforceable. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30–31. Because the
Take Care powers revolve around executing laws rather than making them, the Court quickly
rejected this argument based on its previous determination that the judgment is not domestic
law, and that the President cannot execute something that it not law. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at
1372.
86. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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but he ultimately agreed with the majority’s determination that both
the treaties and the Avena judgment are non-self-executing.
Justice Stevens also agreed with the majority’s holding that the
91
President cannot unilaterally implement a non-self-executing treaty,
but expressed a greater concern than the majority regarding the
United States’ general international obligation to adhere to treaties to
92
which the United States is a party. Justice Stevens also pointed out
that because of the federalist structure of the United States’ legal
system, the burden of the obligation to adhere to the United States’
international commitments fell on the Texas state courts; the Texas
state courts’ refusal to adhere to that obligation caused the case to
progress this far and create such international strife.93 Texas could
have eased the international pressure surrounding the Medellín
decision by choosing to follow the Avena decision.94
C. The Dissent’s Seven Factors for Self-Execution
In a dissent joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, Justice Breyer
argued that the majority was too concerned with the treaty’s text
rather than with the means by which the United States implements
treaties.95 According to the dissent, the majority should have
formulated its test from the long line of cases in which the Court had
found that a treaty was self-executing.96
The dissent first asserted that considering just treaty language is
insufficient.97 Treaty language cannot reflect the vast differences
between nations’ legal systems; therefore, each domestic system must
98
be the starting point for treaty interpretation. Looking at the Court’s
precedent, the dissent argued that the Court had historically found a
wide variety of treaties to be self-executing99 and had relied on much

91. Id. at 1374.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1374–75 (pointing out that the Oklahoma judiciary had already accepted the
decision of the ICJ and had reviewed the claims of one of the Avena nationals in its courts).
94. Id. at 1375. Texas eventually chose not to comply with the ICJ’s judgment, and
executed Medellín on August 5, 2008, without having given him the review and reconsideration
demanded by the Avena opinion, Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Medellín Executed for Rape,
Murder of Houston Teens, HOUS. CHRON. Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
metropolitan/5924476.html.
95. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1378–80.
99. Id.

DO NOT DELETE

5/18/2009 4:25:05 PM

204 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:191

more than the “textual clarity” that the majority required.100 From this
precedent, the dissent formulated a seven-factor test for selfexecution.101
First, the relevant treaties—the Optional Protocol and the United
Nations Charter—are self-executing, according to the dissent,102
because they contain mandatory, binding language, which the Court
had previously found determinant when considering whether a treaty
is self-executing.103 The dissent countered the majority’s argument
regarding the enforcement provision of the United Nations Charter
by arguing that Article 94(1) is reserved for when a country chooses
not to comply with a binding ICJ judgment, and thus that it should not
dictate the procedural method used when a country chooses to
104
comply with an ICJ judgment.
Second, the dissent viewed the Vienna Convention itself as self105
executing and the provision at issue as judicially-enforceable. This
led directly to the dissent’s third factor: that it would be incongruous
for a judgment made binding by a self-executing treaty to not also be
self-executing.106 The dissenters interpreted Sanchez-Llamas to hold
only that state procedural rules cannot be overridden by the Vienna
107
Convention. Because of this interpretation, they were able to argue
that the Avena judgment, as a binding ICJ judgment that specifically
dictated that the United States override state procedural rules, is
sufficiently different from a general treaty obligation, that SanchezLlamas does not control.108
Fourth, the majority’s holding could result in negative practical
implications. For example, there are numerous other treaties in which
the United States has submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ to
resolve disputes related to those treaties; it would be unrealistic to

100. Id. at 1381. The dissent later noted that by seeking textual clarity with regard to
whether a treaty is self-executing, the majority was “[h]unting for what the text cannot contain.”
Id. at 1389.
101. Id. at 1383.
102. Id.
103. Id. The dissent relied on the term “compulsory jurisdiction” and a dictionary-based
definition of “undertake to comply” to interpret the U.N. Charter’s requirement as a presenttense, mandatory obligation. Id. at 1384–85.
104. Id. at 1385.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1386.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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expect Congress to implement all of those ICJ judgments in order to
resolve those disputes.109
Fifth, the remedy required by the ICJ—review and
reconsideration of the judgments—is one that is clearly within the
110
domain of the judiciary.
Sixth, domestically enforcing the Avena judgment would not
111
create a constitutional conflict.
And seventh, neither the President nor Congress spoke against
112
making this judgment automatically domestically enforceable. For
the dissent, the combination of these seven factors meant that the
113
Avena judgment is self-executing and directly enforceable.
Because the dissent found that the Avena judgment is directly
enforceable, it then had to interpret the judgment and determine what
“review and reconsideration” would require.114 Several elements
convinced the dissent that the case should have been remanded back
to the Texas state courts to apply the Avena judgment: remand is the
usual procedural step here; this case was focused in the Texas state
courts, which would allow for post-conviction proceedings if Medellín
could assert a claim that was unavailable at the time of trial;115 and the
President specifically directed the cases at issue in Avena back to the
state courts.116
The dissent lastly stated that, contrary to the majority, it would
proceed more carefully before asserting that the President can never
override state law without congressional approval117: “silence . . .
118
cannot be taken as agreement with the majority’s decision.” The
dissent concluded by noting that it was particularly concerned with
the failure of the United States to uphold its international legal
obligations.119
109. Id. at 1387–88.
110. Id. at 1388.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1389.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1389–90. See also Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with
the Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html (dictating that the courts
rehear the cases at issue in Avena).
117. Id. at 1390–91.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1391–92.
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III. A HOLLOW VICTORY: MEDELLÍN’S IMPLICATIONS
At their core, the holdings in this case are simple answers to the
questions presented: the Avena decision is not binding federal law just
because the United States has an international obligation to abide by
120
ICJ decisions; and the President does not have the executive
authority to implement the Avena decision domestically and thus
121
overrule state laws. These holdings by themselves are neither
monumental nor unexpected.122 Rather, the implications of the
Medellín decision, and the Court’s implicit assertions within it, will
impact both the legal field surrounding the domestic implementation
of treaties and the United States’ international reputation,
particularly in regards to the ICJ and the binding nature of its
judgments.
The implications of the Court’s analysis are fourfold, the most
important of these implications being that related to self-executing
treaties. First, the Court established an implicit presumption that all
123
treaties are non-self-executing, delineated a test for finding a treaty
124
to be self-executing, and placed the determination as to whether a
treaty is non-self-executing firmly with the judiciary.125 Second, there is
the implication of the Court’s continuing assumption that the Vienna
126
Convention creates judicially-enforceable individual rights. Third,
the Court’s decision did little to change the actual balance of power
between the Court and the Executive,127 and it left lingering questions
regarding the President’s role in determining whether the United
States should adhere to its international obligations and how to
implement those presidential determinations. Finally, the decision

120. Id. at 1361, 1363, 1365 (majority opinion). Note, however, that the Court’s conclusion
rests only on a consideration of the treaties that Medellín identified. Id. at 1364–65.
121. Id. at 1372 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. Kent Scheidegger, Medellín: What Would Congressional Implementation of Avena
Look
Like?,
CRIME
AND
CONSEQUENCES,
Mar.
27,
2008,
http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/2008/03/medellin_what_would_congressio_1.html; see
also Ernie Young, Medellín v. Texas: Another Set of Early Thoughts, Mar. 25, 2008,
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206477292.shtml (noting that the Court’s holdings were
unsurprising).
123. See infra notes 128, 129.
124. See infra Part III.B.
125. See infra Part III.C.
126. See infra Part III.A.
127. See Lyle Denniston, States win Over President on Criminal Law Issue, SCOTUS BLOG,
Mar. 25, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/states-win-over-president-on-criminal-law-issue/
(asserting that the Court struck a heavy blow to the President).
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could also have several important international ramifications for the
United States.
A. Non-Self-Execution: Presumptions
The most important aspect of this case is its implicit presumption
that all treaties are non-self-executing. Though the Court does not
explicitly state as such, its decision clearly indicates acceptance of that
presumption,128 and both the concurrence and the dissent identify and
express their disagreement with it.129 Barring an explicit statement
that the treaty is self-executing either in the treaty or during the
ratification process, under Medellín’s holding, all treaties are
presumed to be non-self-executing.130
This presumption will impact the United States’ international
actions to a greater extent than it will the United States’ domestic
131
actions, in part because it is effectively what the United States
already does domestically. Domestically, the presumption creates a
two-step process in which the United States government must first
ratify a treaty according to the United States Constitution,132 and then,
if necessary, implement any rights granted by that treaty via the
133
The Senate already frequently attaches
legislative branch.
reservations to treaties that state that the United States views the
treaty as non-self-executing;134 the Court’s decision simply affirmed
the legality of this process. Most treaties also operate only at the

128. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 (“[O]nly ‘[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which
are self-executing . . . [will] they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.’” (quoting
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)) (alterations in original)); id. at 1363–64 (“[O]ne
would expect the ratifying parties to . . . have clearly stated their intent to give those judgments
domestic effect . . . .”); id. at 1364 (holding that “treaties [are] self-executing when the textual
provisions indicate that the President and the Senate intended for the agreement to have
domestic effect.”).
129. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1380
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1363–64 (majority opinion).
131. Treaties become binding immediately upon ratification on the international plane,
regardless of the domestic steps that a country may be required to take before its government
could adhere to those obligations. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed.
2003).
132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
133. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1366.
134. CARTER ET AL., supra note 131; see also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1373 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing to a treaty with a reservation making certain clauses nonself-executing).
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international level and thus have little direct domestic impact,
regardless of whether they are self-executing.135
The one area in which this presumption could impact the domestic
actions of the United States would be those treaties, such as human
136
rights treaties, that purport to grant rights to individuals. With a
presumption against self-execution, a United States citizen would be
required to wait until Congress implemented a treaty before any of
the individual rights granted in that treaty would legally attach to that
citizen at a domestic level.137 The Article 36(1) rights at issue in
Medellín exemplify the potential impact of a presumption against selfexecution: the Fifth Circuit found that Article 36(1) was not
individually domestically enforceable and used that determination as
138
an alternate means of denying Medellín the review he sought.
B. Non-Self-Execution: A New Test
The Court also did little to quash the confusion surrounding selfexecution, its definition, and the test that should be used to determine
whether a treaty is self-executing.139
Although the Court did not adopt a definition for self-execution,
it did delineate a definition that it would use for the purposes of the
140
case here. The Court’s definition of self-execution, noted in a
footnote, is a treaty that “has automatic domestic effect as federal law
141
upon ratification.” Key to this definition is what it does not
include—direct effect. The term “self-execution” has been used
interchangeably with “direct effect,”142 something that the Court

135. CARTER, ET AL., supra note 131.
136. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, S. EXEC. DOC. D, 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
137. Additionally, because of the Court’s delineation between self-execution and direct
enforcement, a United States citizen would also have to wait until Congress created a judiciallyenforceable cause of action.
138. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004). Note, however, that the ICJ has
ruled that Article 36(1) does confer individually-enforceable rights. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.),
2001 I.C.J. (June 27).
139. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
140. Id. at 1356 n.2.
141. Id. Of course, the Court’s implicit presumption is that treaties are non-self-executing
and thus that they will not have this automatic domestic effect.
142. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 30–31 (“[S]elf-executing is one of
those words that people use to cover a lot of different meanings . . . . [T]here’s another meaning
of ‘self-executing,’ or maybe it’s a misuse of the term . . . .” (statement of Solicitor General Paul
Clement)). Direct effect means that the treaty confers on an individual the right to enforce the
treaty in domestic courts—i.e., that the treaty itself creates a cause of action in a court of law.
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ignored. Under the Court’s carefully-worded definition of selfexecution, the treaty itself would not serve to create a cause of action
for a violation of any treaty rights, and would, in essence, be judicially
143
unenforceable until Congress chose to make it enforceable.
The Court also implicitly established a new test for self144
execution, but this will likely only further confuse the legal issues
surrounding self-execution and its definition. This confusion results in
part because the majority did not explicitly acknowledge that it was
establishing a new test, and in part because the test that the majority
chose was one of the principal sources of contention between the
dissent and the majority.145 Both the majority and the dissent pointed
to cases in which its test was utilized, and then faulted the other’s
146
analysis. By failing to explicitly adopt (or even to acknowledge) a
new test for self-execution, the Court left lower courts with a choice
between adopting the majority’s test, relying on previous tests,147 or
148
using the dissent’s test. Although the reasons for the Court’s refusal
to explicitly adopt either a definition or a test are significant,149 the
continued lack of clarity only further confuses the issue.
Because the Court did little to change the manner in which
treaties are already viewed, and maintained the confusion
surrounding self-execution, the Court’s definition and test of selfexecution will have little domestic impact.

143. A self-executing treaty would require that the United States adhere to the obligations
within that treaty. Direct effect would mean that an individual citizen could enforce that
obligation in a court. For example, if Article 36(1) were self-executing, police would be
required, as a matter of domestic law, to inform non-citizens of their right to have their consul
informed of their arrest. But only if Article 36(1) were also found to have direct effect could an
individual sue a police officer for failing to inform the individual of that right.
144. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1361–62.
145. See id. at 1373 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Although Justice Stevens
agreed with the majority that the provisions at issue were not self-executing, he did so by relying
on the language of the treaties.
146. See, e.g., id. at 1361–62 (majority opinion); id. at 1377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 31 (noting that self-execution has
been defined as direct effect).
148. See supra Part II.C (describing the dissent’s test).
149. The reasons were: that it will pin the Court to a definition it is not ready to adopt, that
few other countries even consider allowing a treaty to be self-executing, and that treaties
involve sensitive issues in which a flexible definition and test may be preferable. Medellín, 128 S.
Ct. at 1356 n.2, 1363 (majority opinion).

DO NOT DELETE

5/18/2009 4:25:05 PM

210 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:191

C. Non-Self Execution: A Judicial Determination
The Court’s decision did, however, clearly place the power to
determine whether a judgment is self-executing with the judiciary, not
with Congress, which also served as another point of contention
150
between the dissent and the majority. The judiciary would, under the
majority’s test, examine the text and ratification history of the treaty
151
to determine whether it was self-executing; logically, then, Congress
itself could dictate whether a treaty was self-executing merely by
indicating its opinion regarding self-execution during the treaty
drafting and ratification process. According to the dissent, however,
the Court’s opaque definition of self-execution could easily make a
determination as to whether a treaty was self-executing unworkable if
Congress, although it intended for a treaty to be self-executing, did
not use the appropriate language.152 The dissent’s seven-factor test
would serve to quell this potential problem, as it would rely on more
153
than Congress inserting the magic self-executing words.
D. Direct Effect: The Vienna Convention
An additional impact of the Court’s decision is the continued
assumption that the rights granted by the Vienna Convention are
individually judicially-enforceable.154 The Court has never ruled on
this issue, but has always assumed that the treaty creates a cause of
155
action that the judiciary can enforce. This case further solidifies that
assumption within the Court’s jurisprudence, and will make it
increasingly harder for the Court to rule that Vienna Convention
rights are not directly enforceable.
E. The Balance of Power
The impact of Medellín on executive power and the balance of
power between the Executive and the judiciary is fairly limited.
Although the decision could be read as one in which the Court, by
denying the Executive the ability to unilaterally implement a foreign
judgment, asserted its power over the Executive, the actual holding is
150. See, e.g., id. at 1362.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1388 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1357 n.4 (majority opinion).
155. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006); Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).
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quite narrow. In a footnote, the majority limited the impact of its
decision to bind only cases that share almost the exact same
circumstances: the President attempting to create federal law by
himself based on the judgment of an international tribunal that was
established by and is operating under non-self-executing treaties.156
In light of the footnote, the case does little to change the current
balance of power between the courts and the President. Indeed, the
Court may have been confined in its ability to rule otherwise: the
Government made clear that although it disagreed with the decision
in Avena, it wanted to enforce the judgment for diplomatic reasons,
not because of any intrinsic belief in ICJ decisions, or even in the ICJ
157
itself. It would have been inconsistent for the Court to grant the
President the power to domestically implement the judgment of an
international court when the President clearly did not believe that the
international court should have any domestic power.
The Court also chose to ignore several additional questions
related to the President’s memorandum. The informal nature of the
memorandum was not addressed, only the President’s authority to
implement domestic law.158 The implicit assumption is that had he
been able to implement the Avena judgment, his memorandum would
have been sufficient. This assumption presents enormous implications
regarding what the President would be required to do (or not to do)
to implement treaties into domestic law. The nature of the President’s
memorandum is not something that figured prominently in the case,
but is an interesting sidenote about the procedural formality that
would be required if the President did have the power to implement
treaties into domestic law.
A final area in which the balance of power may have shifted
concerns the President’s ability to decide whether to comply with a
decision by the ICJ. Given the United States’ emphatic assertion that
the President alone should decide whether to comply with ICJ
decisions,159 the Court’s decision, which effectively placed that
determination with the judiciary, could serve as a potential source of
contention between the President and the Court.

156. Medellín, 128 S. Ct at 1367 n.13.
157. See Brief for the United States, supra note 50, at 4. The United States’ decision to pull
out of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction for disputes related to Vienna Convention claims
provides evidence of this lack of faith in ICJ decisions.
158. See Ex Parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
159. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1367.
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F. The United States and the Rest of the World
This decision will do little to help the increasingly negative world
opinion of the United States and its ability to adhere to its
160
international obligations. The fight over the interpretation and
domestic implementation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention has
caused a great deal of strife between the United States and Mexico, as
well as between the United States and the ICJ. Mexico filed an
additional petition in the ICJ in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in this case, requesting that the ICJ define “review and
reconsideration” and take steps to prevent the execution of any
Mexican national involved in the Avena decision.161 The request
essentially confirms that appropriate review and reconsideration,
particularly for Medellín, did not occur and that Medellín’s execution
placed the United States in breach of the Vienna Convention.162
Regardless of this breach, the United States must defend the Court’s
decision that the Avena judgment is not directly binding on state
courts because it is a Supreme Court decision; and the United States
must also defend Texas’s decision to execute Medellín because of
federalism. This is a tenuous position at best.
The limited domestic implications of the case could be changed by
the international ramifications of the decision. Mexico is fighting the
United States at every turn in the ICJ, and the United States’ clear
dismissal of ICJ judgments is creating further tension both between
the United States and Mexico and between the United States and the
ICJ.163 The United States is in breach of its treaty obligations
according to the judgment of the tribunal established to interpret
164
those treaties, the ICJ. The House of Representatives recently
proposed a bill to implement the Avena decision in response to the

160. E.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Introductory Note to Bush Memorandum on Avena and U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions in Medellín, 44 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 961, 961 (2005).
161. Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Request
for the Indication of Provisional Measures, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/
14639.pdf?PHPSESSID=f33ed999d48709f6524e7df37a6de6dc, p. 4–5. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals set the date of Medellín’s execution as August 5, 2008, and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals denied a stay of execution, Ex Parte Medellín, Order No.WR-50191-03 (Tex.
Crim. App. July 31, 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished order), as did the United State Supreme
Court, Medellín v. Texas, 2008 WL 3821478 (Aug. 5, 2008).
162. Unofficial Press Release, supra note 10, at 12.
163. Id.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 16–24; see also supra note 55.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín;165 the House’s action, however,
did not influence Texas’s decision to execute Medellín, and Texas’s
decision only created further tension between the United States and
Mexico.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court ruled that the Avena judgment was non-selfexecuting and that the President did not have the unilateral power to
enforce the Avena judgment domestically. The Court’s ruling had little
domestic impact. The international impact, however, was much more
significant. This difference elucidates quite nicely the affect that the
Medellín v. Texas decision will have on the United States and on the
international community: the United States will continue to enforce
treaties domestically in the same way it has always done, often
irrespective of the international community’s unfavorable opinion,
and the international community will continue its rumblings against
the United States about those actions.

165. H.R. 6481 (110th, 2nd session, introduced July 14, 2008).

